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JUDGING THE JUDGES:  DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uring the men’s gymnastics individual event final at the 
2004 Athens Games, Russian gymnast Aleksei Nemov 
dismounted from the high bar to the cheers of the crowd.1  Once 
Nemov’s low scores were posted, those cheers turned to an an-
gry roar that rocked the Olympic Indoor Hall, halting competi-
tion for ten minutes.2  Then, suddenly, the scores changed.3  In 
the midst of the chaos, two of the six judges had reconsidered 
their decisions in an apparent attempt to assuage the crowd.4  
Nemov went on to place fifth.5   
Intense media coverage of such judging mishaps has over-
shadowed the athletics at recent Olympic Games.6  Perhaps it is 
the inevitable result of the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, where a 
double gold medal was awarded after a French figure skating 
judge admitted accepting a bribe.7  Perhaps it is the result of a 
  
 1. Rachel Cohen, Accountable Mistakes Happen, but Now Judges Hear it 
When They Mess Up, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, at 4CC. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id.  The fallout from such unprofessional conduct by the Malaysian 
and Canadian judges would have been worse had Nemov managed to win a 
medal with his inflated scores.  Instead, he came in fifth.  See id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See Cohen, supra note 1; Jere Longman, Olympics: The Scorekeepers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at D1 (profiling a Salt Lake City judge who with-
drew, unnerved by charges of political and cultural biases aimed at competi-
tion judges); Candus Thomson & Randy Harvey, An Abundance of Objections 
is Testing Games’ Machinery for Settling Protests, BALT. SUN, Aug. 24, 2004, at 
1A (noting the challenges to judging calls in gymnastics, swimming, eques-
trian and sailing competitions in Athens).  See also Selena Roberts, Editorial, 
IOC Leadership is Lacking a Pulse.  Is There a Doctor in the House?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at Sports 8 (criticizing the International Olympic Com-
mittee for ignoring judging problems in order to avoid confrontation with the 
international sports federations). 
 7. See Christopher Clarey, Skating Federation Turns Its Focus to Judging 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2002, at D1.  At the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, 
French figure skating judge Marie Reine Le Gougne confessed that she had 
been pressured by the president of her national skating federation to favor the 
Russians over the Canadians in the pairs figure skating event.  In response, 
the International Olympic Committee made the unprecedented decision to 
 
D 
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more litigious society in general; most delegations arrive at the 
Olympic Village with lawyers in tow.8  Perhaps the focus has 
been sharpened because sporting stakes, especially at the 
Olympics, are higher:  prize money, commercial endorsements 
and appearance fees can add up to millions of dollars for medal-
lists.9  Perhaps it is as simple as technology—judging errors are 
easy to spot thanks to video replay.10  Whatever the reason, 
Olympic disputes are more heated and high profile than ever 
before. 
The Athens Games was no exception.  The fallout from the 
Nemov incident was quickly obscured by a more contentious 
controversy, the gold medal fight between American Paul 
Hamm and South Korean Yang Tae Young.11  Yang was mis-
takenly docked one-tenth of a point at the start of his parallel 
bars routine during the men’s gymnastics all-around competi-
tion.12  Had he been given the proper starting score—and had 
  
award a duplicate set of gold medals to the Canadian team.  Id.  The contro-
versy prompted the International Skating Union to implement an improved 
scoring system.  Selena Roberts, Skating Group Proposes a New System of 
Judging, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at A1. 
 8. See Peta Bee, Editorial, Olympic Ideals Taken Over by Tantrums and 
Tears, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 30, 2004, at 25 (criticizing “sore-loser ath-
letes” for accusing judges of cheating, rule-breaking and favoritism).  In recent 
years, with doping, performance-enhancing drugs, videotaping of events, etc., 
athletes have become more aware of their rights and the ways to protect them.  
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 64 (2d ed. 2004). 
 9. See Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic 
Athletes: Is the Process Better or Worse for ‘Job Security’?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 655, 664 (1998) (noting that gymnast Kerri Strug and sprinter Michael 
Johnson were projected to make $2 million each in 1996, based on their 
performances in the Atlanta Games). 
 10. The use of technology to resolve controversial field-of-play calls in in-
ternational competition is less common than in professional sports, but it is 
growing, especially in track-and-field, international wrestling and cricket.  In 
contrast, the international football and tennis federations have banned the 
use of video replay.  NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 116–20. 
 11. See Bee, supra note 8. 
 12. Candus Thomson, Arbiters Hear Appeal of Men’s All-Around, BALT. 
SUN, Sept. 28, 2004, at 2E.  In gymnastics, the highest possible point value of 
a routine is determined at the outset, based on the level of difficulty of the 
planned routine, in accordance with the International Gymnastics Federa-
tion’s Code of Points.  See id.  Yang’s routine should have been given a higher 
point value due to its difficult elements.  See Alan Abrahamson & Diane 
Pucin, Hamm Takes Issue with Medal Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2004, at 
D1. 
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the rest of the evening’s competition played out the same—Yang 
would have beaten Hamm to take the gold by 0.051 of a point.13  
The controversy stemmed not only from the judging error made 
during the competition, but also from the International Gym-
nastics Federation’s response to the aftermath.14 
Since 1996, all Olympic disputes have been submitted to an 
independent arbitral tribunal, the International Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport (CAS), for mandatory, binding arbitration.15  
The International Olympic Committee (IOC), which organizes 
the Games, instituted this policy after a rash of lengthy multi-
million dollar battles in various domestic courts in the 1990s.16  
One notorious example was the case of American track star and 
Olympic gold medallist Harry “Butch” Reynolds.17  The govern-
ing body of international track-and-field competitions, the In-
ternational Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), suspended 
Reynolds for two years in 1990 for alleged steroid use, effec-
tively ending his chance to compete in the 1992 Olympic 
Games.18  Reynolds filed an appeal in a U.S. court—a move that 
  
 13. Thomson, supra note 12. 
 14. The Yang case is discussed in depth, infra Part III.A.  For now it is 
enough to note that the International Gymnastics Federation did not handle 
the situation in accordance with its own rules and regulations.  The much-
publicized controversy did not subside until months later, when the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport issued a ruling denying South Korea’s appeal.  See CAS 
Turns Down Yang’s Petition, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004. 
 15. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 74, available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/ 
pdf/en_report_122.pdf (in force as of Sept. 1, 2004).  Rule 74 mandates that all 
Olympic participants submit disputes to the CAS, an international organiza-
tion of sports arbiters that hears both Olympic and non-Olympic sporting 
disputes, including private commercial claims.  Matthieu Reeb, The Court of 
Arbitration for Sport, History, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/hist 
oire/frmhist.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 16. See Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for 
Olympic Ailments: The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sport and the Future for the Settlement of International Sporting Dis-
putes, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 347 (1994).  See also Steve Buffery, Atlanta 
’96 Column, TORONTO SUN, June 9, 1996, at 16 (“It seems any time an Ameri-
can athlete tests positive, a local court instantly reinstates them and then 
they launch a multi-million dollar lawsuit.”).  Just before the 1996 Atlanta 
Games, American heptathlete Gea Johnson filed a $12 million lawsuit against 
the international track-and-field federation for banning her for steroid use.  
Id. 
 17. See Polvino, supra note 16, at 347. 
 18. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 660.  
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sparked jurisdictional conflicts between the U.S. Olympic 
Committee and the IAAF and led to fifteen different stages of 
litigation and arbitration.19  Despite the IAAF’s refusal to ac-
knowledge U.S. jurisdiction, even after the Supreme Court in-
tervened, a district court finally ruled in Reynolds’ favor and 
awarded him a $27.3 million default judgment that the IAAF 
refused to pay.20  Reynolds’ victory, however, came too late.  The 
1992 Olympic Games had come and gone in the four years it 
took for him to get through litigation.21 
The Reynolds saga illustrates the problem of bringing suit in 
domestic courts in matters that implicate the entire Olympic 
Movement, an interconnected web of international, national, 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, each with its 
own statutes, jurisdiction and procedures.22  The IOC had rec-
ognized the need for a tribunal equipped to handle such com-
plexity when it created the CAS in the early 1980s to arbitrate 
disputes voluntarily submitted to it by international sports bod-
ies; however, in the wake of the Reynolds debacle, the IOC re-
cruited the CAS to be the official arbiter of the Olympics.23  To 
meet the special needs of the Games, the CAS created an ad hoc 
Division, a small group of arbiters installed in each Olympic 
Village to issue final, binding decisions within twenty-four 
hours of the complaint.24  Forcing Olympic participants to ac-
  
 19. See James A.R. Nafziger, Dispute Resolution in the Arena of Interna-
tional Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 161, 172 (2002).  See also Bit-
ting, supra note 9, at 661. 
 20. Polvino, supra note 16, at 354–56 (“When asked if the award to Rey-
nolds would be paid, [IAAF President Primo] Nebiolo stated:  ‘Never, never . . . 
he can live 200 years.’”).  Id. at 356. 
 21. See id. at 347.  This was the first time the U.S. Supreme Court had 
ever ruled on an Olympic matter involving competition.  Justice Stevens, in 
his capacity as a circuit Justice, granted Reynolds’ application for a stay of the 
Sixth Circuit’s order barring the IAAF from interfering with Reynolds’ eligibil-
ity for the 1992 U.S. Olympic Trials.  The stay was later upheld by the entire 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 353. 
 22. The Olympic Movement is the dominant international sports institu-
tion and provides the framework for world competitions.  See Nafziger, supra 
note 19, at 162.  
 23. See Reeb, supra note 15, History of the CAS § 1. 
 24. Id.  The CAS’s ad hoc Division, explained in detail, infra Part II.C, is a 
decentralized, temporary branch of the CAS adapted to fit the needs of Olym-
pic participants who want disputes resolved in time for the remedy to be of 
use during the Games.  The CAS has ad hoc branches not only at the Olym-
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cept the CAS as their final legal recourse was a novel, risky 
idea.25  To effectuate the change at the 1996 Atlanta Games, the 
IOC required that all athletes, coaches and officials contractu-
ally waive their right to sue in civil courts.26  It introduced a 
clause into the Eligibility Entry Form binding the signer to the 
arbitration scheme.27  The version for the 2004 Athens Games 
reads: 
I agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, in 
connection with, or on the occasion of, the Olympic Games, not 
resolved after exhaustion of the legal remedies established by  
. . .  the International Federation governing my sport . . . and 
the IOC, shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbi-
tration for Sport (CAS) for final and binding arbitration . . . . 
The CAS shall rule on its jurisdiction and has the exclusive 
power to order provisional and conservatory measures.  The 
decisions of the CAS shall be final and binding.  I shall not in-
stitute any claim, arbitration or litigation, or seek any form of 
relief, in any other court or tribunal.28 
Although there was doubt that the 11,000 athletes from 197 
countries who showed up to compete in Atlanta would willingly 
sign away their right to sue, the implementation of the ad hoc 
Division was largely uneventful.29  For most Olympic partici-
  
pics, but also at the Commonwealth Games and the European Football Cham-
pionships.  Id.  
 25. The IOC amended the Olympic Charter to add Rule 74, which directs 
all disputes to arbitration by the CAS.  OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 74. 
 26. See Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute Resolution at Game Time, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 489, 492–93 (2002) (describing the 
contractual obligations of Olympic participants).   
 27. Id. at 493.  However, the CAS allows for appeal of its decisions to the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal, a domestic Swiss court, on limited grounds.  See id.  
 28. Eligibility Entry Form of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, SPORTS 
ENTRIES AND QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM 8, at http://www.athens2004.com/Files/ 
files/Pdf-Sports/SEQ_MASTER_1_EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).  In addi-
tion to the entry form, the CAS’s jurisdiction is asserted in Rule 74 of the 
Olympic Charter; furthermore, many sports bodies have written CAS jurisdic-
tion into their by-laws.  GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE 
OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 16, 
24–25 (2001).   
 29. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 663; Buffery, supra note 16 (discussing the 
controversy over the newly-required waiver); Mike Fish, Atlanta Grand Prix; 
Drug Testing; IAAF Talking Tough in Johnson Case, ATL. J. & CONST., May 
18, 1996, at 9E (quoting Butch Reynolds as agreeing to the waiver, along with 
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pants, there is no other viable option.30  Contesting mandatory 
arbitration in a court of law, as either unconscionable or as a 
contract of adhesion, might mean a drawn-out court battle 
reminiscent of Reynolds’.31  Furthermore, most athletes’ finan-
cial support from their national committees to train and com-
pete is contingent upon their Olympic eligibility.32  For the seri-
ous medal contenders, the Olympic Games mean prize monies 
and lucrative endorsements, not to mention a chance to fulfill a 
dream.33  With so much at stake, an athlete is unlikely to forfeit 
competition because of an unwillingness to submit to the CAS. 
Because Olympic participants waive a powerful right to sue 
in domestic courts, the IOC’s arbitration scheme must be a wor-
thy substitute.34  The introduction of the ad hoc Division has 
largely been a success, but problems persist.35  The IOC has not 
devoted enough attention to the international federations’ in-
ternal appeals systems—morasses of rules governing how 
members can protest decisions.36  Internal appeals are integral 
to the IOC’s larger arbitration scheme because a claimant can-
not petition the CAS without first exhausting the offending fed-
eration’s own remedies; furthermore, the CAS must consider 
the federation’s applicable rules and regulations as part of the 
law governing the dispute.37 
  
eight-time gold medallist Carl Lewis, and noting track star Michael Johnson’s 
hesitation to sign). 
 30. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 665 (discussing athletes’ financial depend-
ence on Olympic eligibility).   
 31. See id. at 669 (analogizing the eligibility clause to an employment con-
tract, subject to common law defenses).  
 32. Id. at 665. 
 33. See id. at 664. 
 34. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 35–36 (noting that most issues in inter-
national sports are procedural—how to expeditiously and fairly resolve dis-
putes—not disagreements over fundamental values or public policy). 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See HON. MICHAEL J. BELOFF ET AL., SPORTS LAW §§ 2.38–.39 (1999) 
(noting that the notoriously murky rules of sports organizations are often 
drafted by non-lawyers and even those that are lawyer-drafted are not neces-
sarily more clear); KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 100 (Kaufmann-
Kohler, an ad hoc arbiter in Atlanta, Nagano and Sydney, criticizes federation 
rules as being “incomplete, incoherent and badly drafted”). 
 37. The CAS’s rules concerning the ad hoc Division are set forth in the 
ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES, available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/pdf/reglementJO.pdf (in force as of Dec. 17, 2003).  Article 1 reads:  
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If a federation’s internal remedies are inadequate, it becomes 
acutely obvious whenever an athlete challenges a decision to 
the CAS.38  Although the CAS does not review technical deter-
minations, it does evaluate whether the rule at issue, or its ap-
plication, was arbitrary or illegal.39  This requires analyzing the 
circumstances surrounding an alleged error, examining the fed-
eration’s appeals mechanism, and determining whether it 
worked appropriately in the particular case.40  More often than 
not, such an inquiry results in the CAS’s criticism of the federa-
tion’s rules, procedures or policies.41  While the federations 
themselves used to be the final arbiters of their members’ chal-
lenges, the CAS is now in that position; its independent review 
has exposed many internal failings, namely, appeals systems 
that are inefficient, unpredictable and inadequate.42 
Part II of this Note describes the framework of the IOC’s ar-
bitration scheme, including the organization of the CAS and its 
specialized Olympic branch, the ad hoc Division.  Part III looks 
at the persisting problem of the international federations’ 
  
In the case of a request for arbitration against a decision pronounced 
by the IOC, [a National Olympic Committee], an International Fed-
eration or an Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, the 
claimant must, before filing such request, have exhausted all the in-
ternal remedies available to him/her pursuant to the statutes or regu-
lations of the sports body concerned, unless the time needed to ex-
haust the internal remedies would make the appeal to the CAS ad 
hoc Division ineffective. 
Id. art. 1.  “The Panel shall rule on the dispute pursuant to the Olympic Char-
ter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the rules of law, 
the application of which it deems appropriate.”  Id. art. 17. 
 38. Judging challenges are the majority of cases brought to the CAS during 
the Olympic Games.  Out of six ad hoc decisions from Athens, two involved 
doping suspensions and four involved field-of-play decisions.  All pitted play-
ers and/or their national committees against international federations.  The 
ad hoc Division’s most recent cases are posted under Case Law, CAS website, 
at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/juris/frmjur.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 39. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 173.  See also KAUFMANN-KOHLER, su-
pra note 28, at 25–26 (noting that arbitrators will refrain from interfering 
with the determinations made on the playing field by judges, referees, um-
pires, or other officials, unless the rules have been applied in bad faith or ma-
liciously). 
 40. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 7.116–.127, 8.108 (setting out the 
legal principles the CAS uses to evaluate disputes). 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. See id. 
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flawed appellate processes.  Part IV suggests what might be 
done to improve the situation and to guarantee Olympic par-
ticipants the best substitute possible for their waived right to 
sue.  It proposes that the IOC create and implement a model 
internal appeals system for the federations to adopt, along the 
lines of the anti-doping rules promulgated by the IOC and the 
World Anti-Doping Agency.  Part V posits that a uniform sys-
tem would contribute to the developing body of lex sportiva, or 
sports law, as well as the IOC’s and the CAS’s positions as 
stewards of this movement. 
II. THE PLAYERS IN THE IOC’S SCHEME 
A. The International Olympic Committee and the  
Olympic Movement 
The IOC, a non-governmental, non-profit international or-
ganization, was founded in 1894 by French educator Pierre de 
Coubertin, who wished to revive the ancient Olympic Games in 
the modern world.43  More than a century later, the IOC leads 
the Olympic Movement, which is comprised of international 
sports federations, national Olympic committees,44 organizing 
committees of the Olympic Games, national athletic associa-
tions, and “other organizations and institutions as recognized 
by the IOC,” such as the World Anti-Doping Agency.45  The IOC 
  
 43. OLYMPIC CHARTER pmbl.  In 1896, the first modern Olympics was held 
in Athens.  Id. 
 44. The national Olympic committees (NOC’s) are composed of national 
sports organizations affiliated with international federations.  They oversee 
sports activity on the national level and represent their delegations at IOC-
sponsored world competitions.  The NOC’s are entrusted with deciding which 
athletes will compete from those nominated by various national federations; 
they ensure that athletes comply with all provisions of the Olympic Charter; 
they provide for equipment, transportation and accommodation of athletes; 
and they determine the clothing and uniforms to be worn.  OLYMPIC CHARTER 
R. 28–29. 
 45. The World Anti-Doping Agency, discussed infra Part IV.A, is an inde-
pendent agency that oversees and administers the IOC-sponsored anti-doping 
policy.  Other examples of sports institutions recognized by the IOC as Olym-
pic partners are the CAS, the International Committee for Fair Play, the In-
ternational Paralympic Committee, and the World Olympians Association, to 
name a few.  For a list of all the Olympic partners, see the IOC website at 
http://www.olympic.org/uk/organisation/actions/index_uk.asp (last visited Apr. 
14, 2005). 
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coordinates and monitors all of these diverse bodies in its efforts 
to organize elite sporting events and to promote ethics in 
sports.46  In order to be recognized by the IOC—a requirement 
of participation in IOC-sanctioned events including the 
Games—these entities must ensure that their statutes, prac-
tices and activities conform to the Olympic Charter.47  They 
must also comply with the obligations imposed upon them by 
other governing umbrella organizations.48  For example, the 
German Equestrian Association has contractual obligations to 
the International Equestrian Federation, and both entities are 
bound to the IOC through the Olympic Charter.49  Beyond ob-
serving the reciprocal rights and duties created by these obliga-
tions, the sports bodies operate autonomously.50  Therefore, the 
rights and obligations of any participant in world sports, includ-
ing clubs, athletes, judges, referees, coaches and sports techni-
cians, are determined by overlapping contracts, codes and stat-
utes.51 
  
 46. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 2.  The IOC is recognized in international law as 
a corporation with perpetual succession; therefore, it can act as a legal person 
on the international plane.  C. Christine Ansley, International Athletic Dis-
pute Resolution: Tarnishing the Olympic Dream, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 
277, 283 (1995).  It maintains its authority by retaining all rights relating to 
the organization, marketing, broadcasting and reproduction of the Olympic 
Games, the high visibility of which places the IOC at the forefront of the in-
ternational sports world.  See OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 6–14; NAFZIGER, supra 
note 8, at 4.  However, the IOC is a non-governmental organization with no 
real method of compelling governmental compliance.  It influences the devel-
opment of international sports law through “rules, regulations and decisions 
[that] help determine state practice and best articulate the accepted regime of 
international sports law.”  Id. at 5. 
 47. “Any person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to 
the Olympic Movement is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and 
shall abide by the decisions of the IOC.”  OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 1(2). 
 48. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.31–.32. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Polvino, supra note 16, at 348–52; BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 
1.10, 2.32.  See also NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 66 (comparing domestic suits 
with private international lawsuits that raise complicated questions of juris-
diction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments). 
 51. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.32. 
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B. The International Sports Federations 
The IOC leaves the administration of each Olympic event to 
the international federation governing that particular sport.52  
These powerful non-governmental bodies run competitions at 
the world level.53  Each federation has its own set of technical 
rules governing the sport, procedural rules for internal appeals, 
and sanctions for athletes, coaches and officials.54  The federa-
tions select judges, referees and other technical persons, estab-
lish the rules of judging and timing, set the results standards, 
and certify the final results and rankings.55  There are currently 
thirty-five federations that comply with the Olympic Charter 
and are allowed to participate in the Olympic Games, other 
IOC-sponsored events, and the annual meeting of the IOC Ex-
ecutive Board.56  In addition, the federations form various asso-
ciations that meet to discuss common problems, to work out cal-
endars of events and to combine forces when dealing with the 
IOC.57   
C. The Court of Arbitration for Sport and its ad hoc Division 
The CAS was formally established as an international sports 
tribunal in 1983, but it underwent a defining reformation in 
1994 after the Swiss Federal Tribunal drew attention to the 
CAS’s dependence on the IOC and potential problems of impar-
tiality.58  In response, the IOC developed an independent body, 
  
 52. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27. 
 53. See Bitting, supra note 9, at 659. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27. 
 56. International Sports Federations, IOC website, at http://www.olympic. 
org/uk/organisation/if/index_uk.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).  There are 
over 100 international federations, however, only thirty-five are IOC-
recognized as Olympic participants.  See id.  For a list of all the international 
federations, see the General Association of International Sports Federations 
website, at http://www.agfisonline.com/en/members.phtml (last visited Apr. 
14, 2005). 
 57. The Olympic Charter gives the federations the right to “formulate pro-
posals addressed to the IOC concerning the Olympic Charter and the Olympic 
Movement; collaborate in the preparation of Olympic Congresses; and partici-
pate, on request from the IOC, in the activities of the IOC Commissions.”  
OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 27. 
 58. Reeb, supra note 15, History of the CAS § 2.  In its original form, the 
CAS was almost entirely financed by the IOC; the IOC executive board was 
 
File: SavareseMACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on: 6/8/2005 1:43 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:48 PM 
2005] DISPUTE RESOLUTION  1117 
 
the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), to 
control the CAS’s operations and financing in place of the IOC.59  
This change went far in establishing the CAS’s credibility as it 
continued to expand.60  In 1996 the CAS created two offices in 
Denver and Sydney, in addition to its permanent seat in 
Lausanne, Switzerland.61  In its short existence, the CAS has 
heard some 576 cases, resulting in more than 314 awards and 
sixteen advisory opinions.62  It has become a central mechanism 
for resolving international sports disputes brought by individu-
als, federations and national governing bodies, ranging from 
contractual (the validity of vendor contracts) to fundamental 
(the eligibility or suspension of athletes).63  One of the reasons 
for its rapid growth is that many federations have granted the 
  
the only body with the power to change the CAS statute; and the IOC and its 
president could together appoint thirty members of the CAS.  Id.  
 59. See id. § 4.  However, it should be noted that the CAS and ICAS still 
have a connection to the IOC and other sports organizations.  The twenty 
members of ICAS, a mix of international jurists who are independent of sports 
organizations, are appointed by the associations of international federations, 
the NOC’s and the IOC.  Furthermore, as of 2001, about seventy-five percent 
of the budget of ICAS and CAS was funded in equal shares by the same or-
ganizations.  The rest was paid by private companies using the CAS to arbi-
trate contract-based disputes.  KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 41–42. 
 60. The CAS solidified its two main arbitration divisions, one for ordinary 
arbitration, where the CAS acts as the court in the sole instance, and the 
other division for appeals arbitration where the CAS hears appeals of final 
rulings.  See Reeb, supra note 15, Organisation and Structure of ICAS and 
CAS § 3.  In addition to this growth, the CAS has been approved by several 
domestic courts.  The Court of Appeals of Munich, Germany, the Swiss Su-
preme Court and the New South Wales Court of Appeals, among others, have 
held that the CAS is a “true” arbitral tribunal, i.e., a tribunal with a constitu-
tion over which no party exercises an overreaching influence, in contrast with 
the internal tribunals of sports federations.  KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 
28, at 3–4, 16 n.42. 
 61. Reeb, supra note 15, Organisation and Structure of ICAS and CAS § 3.  
The decentralized locations were created to provide sports participants from 
around the world with greater accessibility to the CAS.  Id.  
 62. These statistics reflect the complaints submitted to the CAS as of De-
cember 2003.  Statistics, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/stat/ 
frmstat.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 63. Nafziger, supra note 19, at 167.  The CAS also provides for mediation 
services, where the parties choose their own mediator who does not craft a 
solution like an arbitrator does, but instead facilitates an environment where 
the parties can reach their own compromise position.  See Reeb, supra note 15, 
Organisation and Structure of the ICAS and CAS § 1. 
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CAS compulsory jurisdiction by including mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in their business contracts.64   
The ad hoc Division, the twenty-four hour arbiter of Olympic 
disputes, has been tailored to fit the needs of the Olympic 
Games, i.e., to be “simple, flexible and free of charge.”65  A 
claimant disputing a decision by the IOC, a federation or a na-
tional committee, who has exhausted the organization’s internal 
remedies,66 must present a written complaint to the Division 
stating the claim, legal arguments and requested relief.67  There 
is then a hearing before a panel of three Division arbiters.68  
They are all neutral third parties with legal training and 
proven expertise in sports law.69  The Division considers the 
organization’s constitution, its powers over the claimant’s per-
son or property, its adherence to the principles of good faith and 
general contract law, and its compliance with procedural fair-
ness.70  It resolves the dispute “pursuant to the Olympic Char-
ter, the applicable regulations, general principles of law and the 
rules of law, the application of which it deems appropriate.”71 
  
 64. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 166–68.  Like the IOC, many federa-
tions have provisions in their contracts binding participants in federation-
sanctioned events to arbitration.  Id.  
 65. Reeb, supra note 15, Decentralised CAS Offices and the Ad Hoc Divi-
sions para. 2.  The Division’s jurisdiction includes “any disputes covered by 
Rule 74 of the Olympic Charter, insofar as they arise during the Olympic 
Games or during a period of ten days preceding the Opening Ceremony of the 
Olympic Games.”  ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 1. 
 66. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 1. 
 67. Id. art. 10. 
 68. Id. arts. 11–12.  In Atlanta, the ad hoc Division was composed of two 
co-presidents and twelve arbiters chosen from the more than 150 arbiters of 
the CAS, although the size varies with the competition.  Reeb, supra note 15, 
Decentralised CAS Offices and the Ad Hoc Divisions para. 2.  In Nagano, for 
example, the number of arbiters was reduced to six.  Id. para. 3.  However, to 
save time and reduce the risk of arbiters being challenged, the parties are not 
allowed to choose which arbiters will hear their particular case.  KAUFMANN-
KOHLER, supra note 28, at 43. 
 69. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 12.  An effort is made 
to choose an arbiter who is an expert in the particular sport in contention.  Rt. 
Hon. Sir Philip Otton, Sport–Private Grief or Public Prurience, The Master of 
the Livery’s Annual Lecture before the Worshipful Company of Arbitrators     
¶ 45 (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://www.arbitratorscompany.org/pdfs/Masters_ 
Lecture_2004.pdf. 
 70. Nafziger, supra note 19, at 168. 
 71. ARBITRATION RULES FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES art. 17.  
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The Division has two options at the close of arbitration, either 
to make a final award or to refer the dispute to arbitration by 
the full CAS, in which case it will grant preliminary relief.72  
While this latter option works against the idea of the ad hoc 
Division as a quick arbiter,73 some cases require removal to the 
CAS because of the claimant’s “request for relief, the complexity 
of the dispute, the urgency of its resolution, the extent of the 
evidence required and of the legal issues to be resolved . . . .”74  
The Division’s decisions are final and binding, with leave to ap-
peal to the Swiss civil courts on very limited grounds, such as 
lack of jurisdiction, violation of elementary procedural rules, or 
incompatibility with public policy.75  
III. CAS VERSUS THE FEDERATIONS 
While the CAS has carefully developed and maintained its 
rules and procedures in order to be seen as a fair and legitimate 
arbitral body, the federations have yet to conform to similar 
standards.  The IOC needs to devote as much attention to the 
federations’ appellate structures as it has to cultivating the 
credibility and effectiveness of the CAS.  The current state of 
affairs was highlighted in two CAS decisions stemming from 
the 2004 Athens Games.  The first was the aforementioned con-
troversy between South Korea and the International Gymnas-
tics Federation (FIG).76  The second involved the United States, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom in a dispute over the 
International Equestrian Federation’s (FEI) medalling deci-
sion.77  Not for the first time, the CAS drew attention to the 
flaws in the federations’ internal processes, specifically the fail-
  
 72. Id. art. 20(a)–(b). 
 73. Id. art. 18 (requiring resolution within twenty-four hours of the com-
plaint in all but exceptional cases). 
 74. Id. art. 20(a).  For example, in the case of the South Korean gymnastics 
delegation’s appeal to the CAS, the parties were not prepared to argue on such 
short notice.  They wanted to collect affidavits, depositions, etc., so the Divi-
sion referred the proceedings to the CAS.  See infra Part III.A. 
 75. Presentation, CAS website, at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/present/ 
frmpres.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).  
 76. Yang Tae Young v. FIG, CAS 2004/A/704 (Oct. 21, 2004), at http:// 
www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/yang.pdf. 
 77. CNOSF, BOA, USOC v. FEI NOCG, CAS OG 04/007 (Aug. 21, 2004), at 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/pdf/hoy.pdf [hereinafter Hoy]. 
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ure of the FIG to respect its own procedures in the face of a 
much-publicized controversy and the FEI’s ambiguous rules 
governing both judging standards and internal appeals.78 
A. The Case of Yang Tae Young  
To understand the CAS’s criticism of the FIG, it is worth re-
viewing the events that transpired after the judges miscalcu-
lated the difficulty of Yang’s routine.  According to the FIG’s 
rules, protests must be lodged on the competition floor before 
the next rotation begins, but the South Koreans did not enter 
their challenge until the next day.79  The FIG ruled that the 
protest came too late to overturn the results.80  The federation 
nevertheless immediately reviewed the competition tapes and 
suspended three judges for the remainder of the Athens 
Games—two from Spain and Colombia who determined the in-
correct start value for Yang, and an American judge who over-
  
 78. See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 95–99.  For example, at the 
1998 Nagano Games, the ad hoc Division heard an appeal from Canadian 
snowboarder and gold medallist Ross Rebagliati, who disputed his post-
competition disqualification by the IOC after traces of marijuana were found 
in his system.  The Division had to examine the IOC’s Medical Code governing 
use of drugs at the Games (replaced by the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping 
Code in 2000).  It found that, according to the Medical Code, the IOC could 
treat marijuana as a prohibited substance and require sanctions only if the 
IOC reached an agreement to that effect with the sports federation concerned. 
The IOC had never reached such an agreement with the international ski 
federation, thereby nullifying the IOC’s testing provision and exonerating 
Rebagliati.  Also in Nagano, Ulf Samuelsson, an American citizen and NHL 
player who joined the Swedish Olympic hockey team, was revealed to be an 
American, and thus ineligible to play for the Swedes, two days before the 
quarterfinal game.  The ad hoc Division had to issue a speedy decision:  the 
easy part was agreeing to disqualify Samuelsson.  The more difficult question 
was whether to forfeit Sweden’s victories up to that point.  The hockey federa-
tion’s rules called for a sanction of forfeiture, but the provision was intended 
for championship tournaments, not the Olympic Games, which are structured 
differently.  The Division decided not to disqualify Sweden because of the per-
verse effect it would have on other teams who were not involved, such as Rus-
sia who would then have to play a much stronger team in the quarterfinals.  
The CAS decision was lauded by the sports community, even though it contra-
vened the hockey federation’s rules.  Id. 
 79. See Abrahamson & Pucin, supra note 12. 
 80. Alan Abrahamson, Hamm Asked to Give Up Gold, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2004, at D1. 
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saw the judging panel.81  This move galvanized the South Ko-
rean delegation, which requested that the U.S. Olympic Com-
mittee (USOC) consider a shared gold medal along the lines of 
that awarded to the Canadian pairs skaters at the 2002 Salt 
Lake City Games after the bribery scandal came to light.82  The 
South Korean delegation also threatened to appeal the FIG’s 
ruling to the CAS.83  
Throughout the proceedings, the IOC refused to enter the 
fray.84  The FIG, however, responded to South Korea’s persis-
tence with a letter to the gold medallist American Paul 
Hamm.85  Written by the FIG’s President Bruno Grandi, the 
letter suggested that Hamm voluntarily relinquish his medal to 
Yang, since Yang was “the true winner of the all-around 
competition.”86  Grandi wrote that such a move “would be 
recognized as the ultimate demonstration of fair play by the 
whole world.”87  The USOC denounced Grandi’s request as an 
attempt to deflect the FIG’s own incompetence.88 
  
 81. Id.  See also Juliet Macur, Hamm Ruling Stands, but Ire at Judges 
Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A1. 
 82. See Abrahamson, supra note 80.  
 83. Id. 
 84. IOC President Jacques Rogge stated that because the FIG had already 
certified the results of the gymnastics competition, “For us that is final.”  Liz 
Robbins, South Korean Gymnast Appeals to Top Sports Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2004, at D5. 
 85. Abrahamson, supra note 80. 
 86. The pertinent text of Bruno Grandi’s letter read:  
I wish to remind you that the FIG Executive Committee has admitted 
the error of judgment made on the Parallel Bars and suspended the 
three responsible judges, two from the A panel and the FIG Technical 
Committee member.  Indeed, the start value of the Korean gymnast 
Yang Tae Young was given as 9.9 instead of 10.  As a result, the true 
winner of the All-Around competition is Yang Tae Young.  If, (accord-
ing to your declarations to the press), you would return your medal to 
the Korean if the FIG requested it, then such an action would be rec-
ognized as the ultimate demonstration of fair play by the whole 
world.  The FIG and the IOC would highly appreciate the magnitude 
of this gesture.  At this moment in time, you are the only one who can 
make this decision. 
Letter to Paul Hamm (Aug. 26, 2004), FIG website, at http://www.fig-
gymnastics.com/cache/html/9124-8151-10001.html. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Bill Briggs & John Meyer, USOC Rejects Plea to Forfeit Hamm’s Gold, 
DENV. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at B-01. 
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South Korea lodged a complaint with the ad hoc Division on 
the second to last day of the Games, ten days after the disputed 
competition.89  The Division scheduled a hearing for the next 
day, but both the FIG’s and Hamm’s lawyers asked for an ex-
tension so that they could better prepare and summon key wit-
nesses.90  The Division acquiesced, referring the matter to the 
full CAS.91  On September 27, 2004, the hearing was held in 
Lausanne, and on October 21, 2004, the CAS issued its decision 
dismissing South Korea’s challenge.92 
In denying the appeal, the CAS looked to its own jurispru-
dence on field-of-play decisions.93  It reiterated its well-
developed rule, “[C]ourts may interfere only if an official’s field-
of-play decision is tainted by fraud or arbitrariness or corrup-
tion; otherwise although a Court may have jurisdiction it will 
abstain as a matter of policy from exercising it.”94  Since there 
was no evidence of judge coercion or malice, the CAS could do 
nothing about the judges’ technical error, especially considering 
South Korea’s late appeal.95   
The CAS did take the opportunity to point out some patent 
flaws in the FIG’s rules and procedures, as well as the federa-
tion’s mishandling of the dispute.96  First, the CAS acknowl-
edged that the FIG’s complex judging hierarchy97 allowed for an 
  
 89. Yang, CAS 2004/A/704 ¶ 1.1. 
 90. Id. ¶¶ 1.2–.4. 
 91. Id. ¶ 1.5.  
 92. Id. ¶ 1.8. 
 93. Id. ¶ 3.2. 
 94. Id.   
 95. Id. ¶ 3.8. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The Judges’ Panel in artistic gymnastics consists of two groups of 
judges for each round of competition, one responsible for evaluating composi-
tion and content (technical values) and the other for evaluating execution.  
The Panel also has a Chairman and an expert appointed by that event’s moni-
toring Technical Committee.  The Panel reports to the Superior Jury, which 
consists of a Technical President and two experts appointed by the Technical 
Committee, whose duty it is to supervise the competition, to review the marks 
of judges, to deal with any error in judgment on the part of the judges, and to 
respond with “such action as they consider necessary.”  The Jury of Appeal 
consists of two members of the FIG’s Executive Committee appointed by the 
Presidential Commission, a Technical President, one member of the Technical 
Committee (but not involved in the decision of the Superior Jury or the judg-
ing at the apparatus in question) or an expert judge designated by the rele-
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oversight jury to alter an “extremely incorrect score” in extraor-
dinary circumstances; however, it was unwilling to apply this 
provision to the Yang case because of the rule’s lack of guidance 
on what procedures were necessary to effect such a change.98  
The CAS wrote: 
There is no doubt that a mechanism exists for reversing judg-
ing errors, although there did not appear to be universal fa-
miliarity with it even among those responsible for its operation, 
in particular, there was an unresolved issue as to whether 
special forms had to be used for the purposes of protest.99 
Second, the CAS pointed out the confusion among the parties 
not only as to how, but also as to when precisely before the 
competition’s end a protest must be lodged.100  It noted that the 
FIG’s previous version of the rules had clearly stated that writ-
ten complaints had to be handed to the head of the oversight 
jury “at the latest fifteen minutes after the incident.”101  The 
CAS commented that the FIG was “not able to enlighten us as 
to why the [Technical Rules] had been changed—or even 
when—although U.S. advocates informed us that the amend-
ments appear to date from 1989.”102  The CAS then remarked, 
“We were consoled to hear from FIG that, as a result of the fo-
cus which this dispute has placed on the limitation issue, the 
rules may be revised and thus attain their previous clarity.”103 
The CAS also addressed the federation’s behavior in the af-
termath of the competition, especially that of President Grandi: 
We would respectfully suggest that FIG . . . made three mis-
takes, albeit, we are certain in entire good faith.  Firstly, they 
publicly accepted without qualification that there was an error 
in the judging of their own officials.  True it is that there was 
an error in the start value identifiable when Yang’s perform-
ance was analysed with the aid of the Technical Video.  How-
  
vant Technical Committee.  Following the conclusion of each session, the Jury 
of Appeals deals with any protests lodged.  It also ensures that the require-
ments of the statutes, technical regulations, rules and guidelines are ob-
served.  Id. ¶¶ 3.5–.10. 
 98. Id. ¶¶ 3.10–.14. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added).   
 100. Id. ¶ 3.10 (quoting the FIG’s 1982 technical rules). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. ¶ 3.11.  
 103. Id.  
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ever, an error identified only after a competition is complete is 
immaterial to the result of the competition under FIG’s rules: 
only an error identified during it, and successfully appealed, 
can affect such a result.  Secondly, they publicly said that, but 
for such error, Yang would have won the event.  This, for rea-
sons we have already discussed, is something in realm of 
speculation, not of certainty.  Thirdly, they sought to persuade 
Hamm to surrender his gold medal to Yang when there was no 
reason for him to do so.104 
The CAS specifically addressed Grandi’s suggestion to Hamm to 
relinquish the gold as the “ultimate demonstration” of fair 
play:105 
There was an instance drawn to our attention where in the 
World Trampoline Championship of 2001 an error in judging 
was made and the beneficiary of it, Ms. Ka Aaeva, gave her 
gold medal “in the spirit of friendship and fair play” to the 
runner up Ms. Dogonadze.  She did so because there was, as 
was perceived, no way other than by an act of grace that the 
consequences of the error could be corrected.  Hamm was in-
vited to do the same by FIG.  He declined to do so.  He is, in 
our view, not to be criticized for this.  He was not responsible 
for the judges’ error; and, as we have already observed, he can 
be no more certain than we as to what the outcome would 
have been had the judges not made the mistake.106 
While the CAS stressed Hamm’s blamelessness, his Olympic 
achievement had already been tainted by the prolonged high-
profile controversy.107  Because the Athens Games ended with 
Hamm’s gold medal in dispute, he was denied endorsement con-
tracts, talk show appearances and other benefits that usually 
befall gold medallists.108  Hamm was also criticized in the media 
for not relinquishing the gold to Yang.109 
  
 104. Id. ¶ 4.9. 
 105. See Alan Abrahamson, Worldwide Anti-Doping Code is Given Approval, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at 9.   
 106. Yang, CAS 2004/A/704 ¶ 4.10. 
 107. See Jill Lieber, Despite Scoring Controversy, Gymnast Hamm Feels 
Golden, USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 2004, at 15C (quoting Hamm as stating that 
some of the media has been “very hurtful”). 
 108. See Filip Bondy, Hamm Keeps Gold But Loses Charm, DAILY NEWS, 
Oct. 22, 2004, at 142.  Hamm’s agent, Sheryl Shade, had been under the im-
pression that he would get a Wheaties endorsement until a last minute call 
from the company, just a day after the FIG sent Hamm the letter suggesting 
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B. The Case of Bettina Hoy 
The equestrian Eventing competition consists of three phases:  
dressage, cross-country and two rounds of show jumping where 
competitors navigate a course, peppered with approximately 
fifteen obstacles up to five-feet high and six-feet wide, in a lim-
ited amount of time.110  Whichever combination of horse and 
rider earns the fewest penalties wins.111  During the first round 
of show jumping at the Athens Games, German rider Bettina 
Hoy and her horse crossed the start line, thereby triggering 
both the official internal timing device and the stadium clock.112  
As Hoy approached the first jump, she turned her horse away 
and made a wide circle that brought her, once again, behind the 
start line.113  Hoy then proceeded to cross a second time, upon 
which a judge reset the stadium clock to zero.114  This led Hoy to 
believe that she had finished the course within the ninety-
second time limit, while the internal timer clocked her perform-
ance at thirteen seconds exceeding the maximum.115  The FEI’s 
Ground Jury, after much deliberation, applied thirteen time 
penalties to Hoy, knocking her out of the gold medal position 
and allowing France, Britain and the United States to medal.116  
  
he relinquish the gold medal.  According to Shade, Wheaties wanted no part of 
the controversy.  Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Ian O’Connor, Hamm Should Share Gold, not Wheaties Box, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2004, at 3; Bondy, supra note 108 (suggesting that 
Hamm might have been more than a “disposable Olympic hero” had he 
reached out to Yang during the medal ceremony or campaigned for a shared 
gold medal). 
 110. For purposes of the Olympic competition in Eventing, all riders partici-
pate in dressage, cross-country and the first round of show jumping.  Only the 
top twenty-five qualify for the individual competition and the second round of 
show jumping.  Their scores in all four phases are used to determine their 
individual standings.  Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶ 3.1.  It was during the first 
round of show jumping that Hoy crossed the start line twice.  See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 3.5, 7.1.  The timing is crucial in show jumping because competi-
tors must finish the course within ninety seconds.  Riders must keep their 
eyes both on the course and on the clock to avoid being penalized one point per 
second.  See id. 
 113. See id. ¶ 3.5. 
 114. Id.     
 115. Id.  The internal computerized timing device, the official timer, clocked 
Hoy’s performance at 103 seconds. 
 116. Id. ¶¶ 1.2, 3.6. 
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However, the Germans challenged the ruling to the FEI’s Ap-
peal Committee, which overruled the Ground Jury’s decision on 
fairness grounds.117 
France, Britain and the United States immediately appealed 
to the ad hoc Division, which issued a decision nullifying the 
Appeal Committee’s ruling.118  The Appeal Committee had 
based its jurisdiction to review the Ground Jury’s decision on 
the fact that the case “constituted an issue of interpretation of 
the FEI Rules” and was, therefore, appealable.119  The ad hoc 
Division overturned that holding, asserting that the Ground 
Jury’s ruling was clearly a technical decision, i.e., whether or 
not to impose a time penalty, and that it was, therefore, final 
according to the FEI’s rules.120  The Division rebuked the Ap-
peal Committee for providing a conclusory, erroneous opinion, 
unsubstantiated by any supporting evidence.121  The Division 
offered the following criticism: 
  
 117. Id.  The Appeal Committee reasoned that the restarted stadium clock 
resulted “in a clear injustice to the rider concerned,” who relied on the only 
clock that she could see.  Frankie Sachs, Success from the Jaws of Defeat, 
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at 14. 
 118. Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶ 6.1. 
 119. Id. ¶ 7.2.  The Eventing competition is judged by a three-person 
Ground Jury.  Among its responsibilities is to rule on all times and penalties 
in the show jumping events.  The Ground Jury is “ultimately responsible for 
the jumping of the event and for settling all problems that may arise during 
its jurisdiction.”  Id.  Any field-of-play decision by the Ground Jury is final, 
i.e., not reviewable by the Appeal Committee.  See id. 
 120. Id. ¶¶ 8.2, 8.6. 
 121. The Appeal Committee’s decision (written in the third-person) in its 
entirety: 
The Appeal Committee started by considering whether they had ju-
risdiction to deal with the case presented.  The Committee agreed 
that the case came under Art 163.6 as an interpretation of the rules 
and so agreed to proceed with the hearing.   
The Appeal Committee considered the appeal of the German Federa-
tion against the time penalties awarded to Bettina Hoy during the 
Eventing Team Jumping and Individual Qualifier.   
The Committee concluded that the countdown had been restarted re-
sulting in a clear injustice to the rider concerned.  The Committee 
therefore removed the time penalties. 
Id. ¶ 3.6 (quoting the Appeal Committee decision). 
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If it had been an interpretation or construction issue, one 
would have expected, at the very least, an explicit reference to 
the rule or rules giving rise to such issue [in the Committee’s 
decision].  No such reference occurs and none can be inferred.  
The mere assumption by the Appeal Committee, in deliberat-
ing the appeal, that it concerned an interpretation of rules 
could not have the effect of creating such issue or of converting 
a factual issue into a legal one . . . .122   
The Division pointed to drafting problems within the FEI’s 
rules that might have contributed to the Appeal Committee’s 
error.123  It questioned Article 163.6.1 of the FEI’s General 
Regulations, which reads: 
Art. 163. There . . . is no appeal against decisions of the 
Ground Jury in the following cases:  
6.1. Where the question for decision was what in fact hap-
pened during a competition or where marks are awarded for 
performance; Examples (which are not exhaustive): whether 
an obstacle was knocked down, whether a horse was disobedi-
ent . . . what was the time taken for the round, or whether an 
obstacle was jumped within the time; whether, according to 
the Rules, the particular track followed by a competitor has 
caused him to incur a penalty.  Contrast questions involving 
interpretation of the Rules, which can be the subject of ap-
peal.124 
The Division wrote of this rule: 
It is clear that the ruling of the Ground Jury in deciding to 
impose a time penalty on Ms. Hoy was of a purely factual na-
ture falling within its exclusive jurisdiction. There is no merit 
in the suggestion by the FEI . . . that this ruling involved an 
interpretation of rules as apparently envisaged, with no par-
ticular lucidity, in the last sentence appended, it would seem, 
to Article 163.6.1.125 
  
 122. Id. ¶ 8.3. 
 123. Id. ¶ 7.2. 
 124. Id. ¶ 7.2 (alteration in original). 
 125. Although it found no need to reach this alternate claim, the Division 
noted that the Appeal Committee’s decision also violated due process because 
the affected parties had not been notified of the appeal hearing.  Id. ¶¶ 4.2, 
8.2, 8.5. 
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The Division also addressed the German delegation’s opposi-
tion to the CAS’s jurisdiction based on a provision in the FEI 
statute forbidding challenges to Appeal Committee decisions.126  
Even though the Division dismissed the frivolous claim, it still 
had to address the rule’s plain language denying the CAS’s 
well-established jurisdiction.127  Valuable time was wasted on 
an issue that should not have been in contention.128  The FEI’s 
own representative at the arbitration hearing did not bring the 
same jurisdictional challenge; presumably, he knew the FEI 
rules denying the CAS jurisdiction were outdated and irrele-
vant.129 
IV. REWRITING THE RULES 
There are two prevailing views on how courts of arbitration 
should treat the rules governing a sports body.130  The first sug-
gests construing the organization’s rulebook sensibly, in accor-
dance with the spirit of the activity to which it applies, rather 
than in an overly technical manner.131  This view is countered 
by the idea that such rules are quasi-statutory at this point in 
the development of sports and they need to be predictable and 
clear, especially in the disciplinary context where athletes de-
  
 126. Id. ¶ 6.1.  The Division wrote:  
[The German team] submitted at the outset that the CAS ad hoc Di-
vision did not have jurisdiction to hear the present appeal by reason 
of the provisions of Article 170.2.2 of the FEI General Regulations.  
In accordance with this Article, appeals against decisions of the Ap-
peal Committee on appeal from the Ground Jury were not appeal-
able, regardless of whether the Appeal Committee had jurisdiction or 
not.  There is no merit in this submission, which was not supported 
by [the FEI itself].  As mentioned before . . . Article 170.2.2 is in con-
flict with . . . a variety of other binding provisions relating to the ju-
risdiction of CAS. 
Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 6.1. 
 127. Id.  
 128. The issue of the CAS’s jurisdiction at the Olympic Games is well-
settled.  See KAUFMANN-KOHLER, supra note 28, at 24–25. 
 129. Leaving irrelevant, conflicting rules in the statutes of sports organiza-
tions leads to confusion and squandered effort.  See Hoy, CAS OG 04/007 ¶¶ 
2.5, 6.1. 
 130. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.40.  See J. Paul McCutcheon, Sports 
Discipline and the Rule of Law, in LAW AND SPORT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
115, 116 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2000).  
 131. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 2.40. 
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serve fair notice of offenses and sanctions.132  The CAS, like 
most tribunals, favors the former view, striving for purposive 
construction, i.e., to “discern the intention of the rule-makers, 
and not to frustrate it.”133  However, this reasoned approach 
often falls apart:  it is impossible to discern a drafter’s intent 
where the plain language contradicts itself and where additions 
and amendments have been made without an eye to the docu-
ment as a whole.134   
In the instant case, the rules detailing the appellate proce-
dures of the FIG and the FEI did not provide adequate guidance 
to those obliged to follow, implement and interpret them.135  The 
ambiguity caused the CAS—in an attempt at purposive con-
struction—to vet the federations’ rulebooks.136  This works 
against the quick and efficient resolution that the IOC envi-
sioned when it authorized the CAS to arbitrate the Olympic 
Games.137  To remedy the situation, the IOC could develop a 
model internal appeals system that each federation must adopt 
in order to maintain its IOC-recognized status.  Instead of the 
various configurations of Ground Juries and Appeal Commit-
tees with convoluted jurisdictional and procedural rules, the 
  
 132. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 121.  McCutcheon argues that 
especially in the context of disciplinary rules, “offenses should be defined in 
advance and with sufficient clarity so as to put athletes on notice” of the pro-
hibited conduct and sanctions.  Broad, open-ended offenses such as “bringing 
the game into disrepute” or “misconduct” that are contained in many sports 
codes do not give reasonable notice of what is proscribed, and they are liable 
to place too much discretion in the hands of the decision-maker.  Id. 
 133. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.40, 1.18 (the CAS’s decisions have 
reflected and promoted “the distinctive sporting principles of fair play and 
good sportsmanship in applying technical rules; the equality of athletes before 
the law; the construction of sporting rules so as not to distort their purpose; a 
respect for sporting decisions; and a flexible and pragmatic approach to entry 
deadlines.”).  
 134. See id. § 2.38 (noting the CAS’s recent criticism of “drafting that en-
genders controversy”). 
 135. See id. § 2.38 n.26 (citing previous CAS decisions that criticized federa-
tion rules). 
 136. See supra Part III. 
 137. The IOC’s vision for the ad hoc Division was that it would be “simple, 
flexible and free of charge.”  See Reeb, supra note 15, Decentralised CAS Of-
fices and the Ad Hoc Divisions para. 2.  The CAS’s duty is to “ensure that the 
appropriate regulations have been observed and that the principles of due 
process and natural justice have been followed pursuant to the rules estab-
lished for CAS.”  Id. 
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IOC could establish a simple hierarchy, a single set of rules 
governing when and how a protest can be lodged, and a clear 
policy on how to deal fairly with challenges.  The basic rules 
would be known to all and used by all participating in the 
Olympic Games.138  Any CAS solution to problems that might 
arise would be disseminated for the benefit and strengthening 
of all similarly affected.139  The federations would be able to tai-
lor the model to their own particular needs and would retain 
independence in judgment-making, but a common structure 
would imbue the regime with an objectivity that it currently 
lacks. 
A. The WADA Precedent 
The IOC’s successful implementation of an anti-doping re-
gime throughout the Olympic Movement supplies strong evi-
dence that it could introduce a similar initiative aimed at over-
hauling the federations’ appeals systems.  Its development of 
the Anti-Doping Code in 2000 led to the creation of the inde-
pendent World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 2003.140  Not 
only has WADA set international standards for drug testing, it 
has also promulgated a set of model rules adopted by world 
sports organizations, including the federations, that cover test-
ing, sanctions and appeals.141  WADA was a solution born of 
  
 138. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 8.122–.124.  Beloff suggests an 
even broader solution, i.e., that every nation adopt a unitary dispute resolu-
tion forum that would have final redress before the CAS.  He criticizes sports 
bodies that continue to internally resolve their own disputes and sees the 
CAS’s experience and pedigree as making it the best model for replication.  Id. 
 139. Furthermore, having each federation follow a common model might 
help federation leaders adhere to the rules in the face of public pressures or, 
alternatively, give the IOC a reason to monitor the federations’ leadership to 
make sure they remain uninfluenced by politics, media pressure and other 
considerations.   
 140. See About WADA, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2005).  The Olympic Anti-Doping Code codified the disparate 
rules and procedures of the federations, CAS awards, and judicial decisions 
from various domestic courts.  See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 161. 
 141. WADA: Model of Best Practice for International Federations, Draft 
version 2.0 (July 23, 2003), at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document 
/if_model_rules_v2.pdf.  As it did with the CAS, the IOC encouraged and de-
veloped the creation of WADA, but stepped away from it in order to preserve 
its legitimacy and, presumably, to encourage sports organizations to adopt the 
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necessity.142  In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, inci-
dents of athlete doping continued to rise.143  The IOC’s attempts 
to create a comprehensive anti-doping policy were continually 
thwarted.144  It already had jurisdiction over the problem 
through the Olympic Charter,145 but it could not find a means of 
effective implementation.146  Getting the sports bodies to agree 
on an official list of prohibited substances; developing accept-
able, well-documented laboratory testing procedures; and secur-
ing the participation of all world sports organizations proved 
problematic.147  Drug testing remained notoriously haphaz-
ard.148  There was even evidence of state-administered doping 
  
Model Rules.  WADA is now an independent organization, funded in equal 
parts by the Olympic Movement and various national governments.  See id. 
 142. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 152–53.  At the 1983 Pan American 
Games, twelve athletes were disqualified for failing drug tests.  At the 1984 
Los Angeles Games, eleven athletes were expelled from competition.  At the 
1987 Pan American Games, six athletes were disqualified.  Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. OLYMPIC CHARTER R. 2(8) (stating the IOC’s mission to lead the fight 
against doping in sports), R. 45 (eligibility code requiring participants to re-
spect and comply with the World Anti-Doping Code), R. 48 (providing for a 
Medical Commission to implement it).  Id.  There are also IOC-accredited labs 
which conduct drug testing.  NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 148. 
 146. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 151–55.  The IOC first instituted anti-
doping rules in 1967, and it required each competition site to have testing 
facilities and each competitor to submit to testing in the 1970s.  Then in 1987 
the IOC’s Medical Commission recommended to the international federations 
a two-tiered sanction plan in an effort to encourage uniform standards, and a 
comprehensive International Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport.  
However, this accord overlapped, contradicted and conflicted with multiple 
other accords inspired at the same time, such as the U.S.-Soviet Mutual Dop-
ing Control Agreement, a multilateral agreement based on the U.S.-Soviet 
pact and supervised by the IOC’s Medical Commission, the Council of 
Europe’s Anti-Doping Convention, and a trilateral agreement between Austra-
lia, Canada and the United Kingdom.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 149–55. 
 148. Id. at 152.  For example, the Athletic Congress of the USA (TAC) re-
fused to conduct extensive drug tests at its track-and-field trials leading up to 
the 1983 Pan American Games, despite heavy lobbying by the chair of TAC 
women’s track-and-field committee, who felt that TAC’s reluctance to test for 
illegal drugs was an implicit condonation.  Id. 
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and passivity among sports administrators entrusted with the 
task of policing athletes.149  
WADA was the compromise necessary to get the disparate 
organizations on board.  The IOC-recognized federations, as 
well as those sports bodies who do not participate in the Olym-
pic Games, have all signed on to WADA.150  It is flexible enough 
to preserve each federation’s decision-making autonomy, while 
providing a comprehensive common framework.151  WADA offers 
training assistance in implementing the model rules and tailor-
ing them to the needs of each organization.152  Signatories 
(called “stakeholders”) may modify the rules or develop their 
own, subject to review and approval by WADA.153  All of these 
attributes can be carried over to a similar system targeting in-
ternal appeals. 
B. Incentives for the Federations 
If the IOC could propose a model framework with both the 
flexibility and structure of WADA, the federations might em-
brace the idea as a more attractive option than being berated by 
CAS decisions and media criticisms after high-profile disputes.  
They struggle every time their internal flaws are caught in the 
  
 149. Id.  During the Cold War, massive sports programs, particularly in 
China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, used doping as a performance 
enhancer in international competitions.  Id. 
 150. Abrahamson, supra note 105.  WADA has been approved by sixty-five 
sports federations and seventy-three national governments.  Id.  As with the 
arbitration clause, the IOC required all sports bodies participating in the 
Olympic Games to adopt WADA into their by-laws by the start of the 2004 
Athens Games.  Code Acceptance, WADA website, at www.wada-ama.org (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 151. The federations have not relinquished their autonomy or control in the 
WADA regime.  For example, they grant Therapeutic Use Exceptions (TUE’s) 
to athletes who need to take prescribed medications that contain prohibited 
substances.  While the IOC can review the TUE’s to see if they are in compli-
ance with the relevant rules and then inform the federations and WADA of its 
advisory opinion, it cannot overrule the federation’s decision.  Furthermore, if 
a federation sanctions an athlete for doping as a result of a federation-ordered 
test, the IOC must respect the decision as long as the procedures used were in 
accordance with WADA standards.  See WADA Independent Observers Re-
port, Olympic Summer Games Athens 2004, at 63, 80, at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/AthensIOReport.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 152. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 162.  
 153. Id.  
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spotlight.  After the Salt Lake City scandal, the International 
Skating Union scrambled to implement an improved judging 
system.154  Shortly before the Yang hearing at the CAS, the FIG 
met in Turkey to revise its rules and structure.155  Instituting a 
model appellate system might be a welcome alternative to such 
piecemeal and reactionary reform, especially since it would 
likely be developed through the money, expertise and support of 
both the IOC and the federations, as was the case with 
WADA.156 
Furthermore, each time the CAS is forced to make basic 
sense out of a federation’s conflicting, inarticulate rules, it de-
tracts from the CAS’s true role of deciding whether those rules 
were fairly applied.157  The CAS has been criticizing the federa-
tions on this point for most of its short existence.158  Those di-
rectly rebuked have scrambled to improve, but others have let 
comparable flaws persist.  This lack of proactive response to 
CAS decisions undermines the CAS as an authoritative body 
when, ironically, the federations have largely embraced it.159  
Not only do they encounter the ad hoc Division during the 
Olympic Games, but many federations have voluntarily submit-
ted to the CAS’s compulsory jurisdiction in all their business 
dealings.160  It is in the federations’ own interest to further le-
gitimize the CAS.161   
  
 154. See Roberts, supra note 7 (describing the Salt Lake City bribery inci-
dent and subsequent changes to the skating federation’s scoring system). 
 155. Thomson, supra note 12.  
 156. The WADA rules were developed through the collective efforts of the 
IOC, the federations, the NOC’s and other world sports organizations.  Fund-
ing, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 157. See supra Part III. 
 158. See supra note 135. 
 159. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 166.  
 160. Id. 
 161. But see the reprinted speech of Paul H. Haagen, Professor of Sports 
Law at Duke University, “Have the Wheels Already Been Invented?  The 
Court of Arbitration for Sport as a Model of Dispute Resolution,” at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/sportscenter/haagen.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).  
Professor Haagen expresses mixed feelings about the effectiveness of the CAS 
as the leading governing body of the sports world.  He does not feel the CAS 
has shown its complete independence from the IOC, federations and NOC’s.  
Furthermore, the CAS, like other arbitral bodies, is not tied to precedent.  In 
his estimation, the CAS has all the “advantages that come with greater infor-
mality and all of the disadvantages of them as well.”  Id. at 7. 
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Those opposed to a model appeals system might cite issues of 
autonomy and argue that world sports bodies, especially the 
federations, have flourished under the current regime.162  The 
federations have endured for decades with unique structures by 
building alliances and developing distinct cultures.163  They 
have become powerful international institutions and serve as 
an important counterweight to the IOC.164  Having the IOC dic-
tate yet another far-reaching policy that impacts the federa-
tions’ internal structures might damage the balance of power.165  
However, such “autonomy” can also be seen as a quagmire of 
rules, procedures, policies and politics, a most inadequate, con-
fused system for an increasingly sophisticated sports world.166  
Having uniform appellate structures would not encroach on the 
federations’ inherent discretion and would leave intact their 
oversight experts and technical criteria.  There would be even 
less cause for alarm if the model rules were infused with the 
same flexibility as the WADA rules, allowing for reasonable 
modification to accommodate specific needs.167 
  
 162. On the other hand, some would argue that improved internal appeals 
are not enough: 
[B]rilliant athletes at the peak of their career can be destroyed by the 
absence of coherent and independent dispute resolution procedures 
which guarantee natural rights and fair process.  Such a body must 
command respect, trust and confidence of participants, governing 
bodies and the public alike.  It must be truly independent, not merely 
providing better conducted disciplinary committees and appeal pan-
els within the respective National Associations and International 
Federations. 
Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 17.   
 163. See supra Part II.B, describing the federations’ duties and powers.  
 164. Id. 
 165. An argument could be made, however, that the federations’ autonomy 
has always been limited by their contractual obligations to the IOC, and that 
the IOC has jurisdiction over the federations’ internal appeals systems to the 
extent that the latter are integral to CAS arbitration.  See OLYMPIC CHARTER 
R. 74.  
 166. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 2.38, 8.121. 
 167. See About WADA, WADA website, at http://www.wada-ama.org (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2005); BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 1.18, 8.121 (arguing for 
a body of sports law, a unitary code of rules applicable to the resolution of 
sports disputes both domestic and international, spearheaded by CAS deci-
sions); Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 47 (“I believe that the CAS process is the tem-
plate for all competitive sports.  If their procedures were adopted worldwide 
then there would be more harmonisation of the procedural rules of national 
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V. LEX SPORTIVA 
This proposed solution, the WADA model, the CAS’s opinions, 
and even the creation of the CAS itself, all reflect a new phase 
in the development of sports, one that requires a cohesive body 
of sports law.168  As competitions have become more sophisti-
cated and commercialized, the customary ad hoc rules govern-
ing sports have transitioned into more formal, less flexible le-
galistic regimes.169  Fifty years ago, sports were largely played 
by gentlemen and amateurs according to the Corinthian ethic 
(“It’s not whether you win or lose . . . .”).170  Referee and umpire 
decisions were final and inviolate; disciplinary standards were 
casual.171  In contrast, today’s sports participants are willing to 
seek courts and arbitrators to resolve their disputes.172  Elite 
sports have become more of a business than a competitive rec-
reational activity.173  The financial stakes involved are so great 
that the conventions of the marketplace govern, rather than 
those of the clubhouse.174   
  
and international sports governing bodies and the legitimate interest of the 
sport, of sportsmen and sportswomen and the public would be satisfied.”). 
 168. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 116.  McCutcheon describes him-
self as a traditionalist who espouses a non-interventionist approach, so he 
sees the legalizing of sports to be regrettable; however, he recognizes that it is 
the inevitable result of sports’ development.  Id. 
 169. Id.  McCutcheon writes: 
[S]port by its nature is a rule-based activity that ready facilitates a 
disciplinary function.  A myriad of rules—playing rules, eligibility 
rules, competition rules and the like—governs the regular conduct of 
sport and, in consequence, it is necessary to establish an apparatus to 
ensure the interpretation and enforcement of those rules.  An inevi-
table result of the organization and codification of sports rules is the 
corresponding development of an adjudicative and interpretive func-
tion, thus, in effect, sports have developed their own internal “legal 
systems.” 
Id. 
 170. Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 116.  Perhaps an even more com-
pelling change in society than its move toward litigiousness, is its expectation 
that sports should reflect the higher virtues of honesty and moral integrity.  
Id. at 118.  “This demand is uniquely strong in the case of sport and is not 
made in respect of many other aspects of human activity.”  Id. 
 173. Id. at 116–17.  
 174. Id. at 117.  See Bitting, supra note 9, at 664. 
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Those skeptical of the idea of recognizing an independent 
body of sports law might argue that it amounts to a series of 
cases arising in tort, contract law, administrative law, health 
law, etc., that happen to involve sports.175  While this is un-
doubtedly true, the reality is that national and international 
laws are beginning to treat sports activity, sports organizations, 
and the resolution of sports disputes, differently from other ar-
eas of law.176  Discrete sports doctrines are taking shape, as evi-
denced by the deference of many domestic courts toward deci-
sion-making bodies like the CAS.177  Sports have assumed great 
political significance.178  Many countries have sports ministries, 
and governmental involvement in sport at a variety of levels is 
normal.179  Sports law is developing from a powerful mixture of 
commercial interests, international competition and public de-
mand; growing, not from any treaty entered into by sovereign 
states, but from international agreements among independent 
  
 175. See BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.6.  According to Beloff, the debate 
is between traditionally minded, purist lawyers who distrust activity-led “ver-
tical” fields of law, preferring the surer, traditional ground of rule-led “hori-
zontal” law.  Id. 
 176. See id. § 1.7. 
 177. Id.  Many domestic courts have firmly established a region of autonomy 
for decision-making sports bodies, within which the courts decline to intervene 
without a compelling reason.  Id. 
 178. Id. § 1.4.  Beloff writes: 
In South Africa the effort to end apartheid was driven forward, with 
considerable success, by the sporting boycott.  Rights of full citizen-
ship for all aroused high passions in South Africa, but so did rugby, 
cricket, athletics and soccer, for access to which white South Africans 
were prepared to pay a high political price.  When Georgia became an 
independent state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one of the 
first acts of its inaugural government was to apply to join FIFA, the 
world governing body of association football.  To the Georgian people, 
this was probably just as much a badge of sovereign independence as 
formal recognition by other states, membership in the UN, or other 
conventional indicia of statehood.   
Id.  
 179. McCutcheon, supra note 130, at 117.  It has become the norm for gov-
ernments to enthusiastically endorse bids to host the Olympic Games and 
other premiere sporting events.  Id.  See also BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 
1.10 n.8 (noting Malaysia as an example of a country where sports are heavily 
governed by statute).  
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bodies, in particular the Olympic Charter and the various or-
ganizations that form the Olympic Movement.180   
This developing body of sports law has been variously defined 
as a “dynamic, although still incomplete process to avoid, man-
age and resolve disputes among athletes, national sports bodies, 
international sports organizations and governments,”181 as well 
as a “loose but increasingly cohesive body of rules . . . an un-
usual form of international constitutional principle prescribing 
the limited autonomy of non-governmental decision making 
bodies in sport.”182  The decisions of the CAS are seen as sub-
stantively guiding the movement:183 
Arbitral awards are normally binding only in the cases and on 
the parties to which they are addressed.  Unlike judicial deci-
sions in common law systems, arbitral awards therefore have 
no currency as stare decisis . . . . In practice, however, the 
awards and opinions of the CAS provide guidance in later 
cases, strongly influence later awards, and often function as 
precedent.  Also, by reinforcing and helping elaborate estab-
lished rules and principles of international sports law, the ac-
cretion of CAS awards and opinions is gradually forming a 
  
 180. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.10. 
 181. Polvino, supra note 16, at 364. 
 182. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.12. 
 183. See NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 48.  Furthermore, the Olympic Move-
ment lies at the heart of the legal processes driving the development of inter-
national sports law.  The movement is unique because it is non-governmental 
and well-organized, although “at present, the Olympic Charter falls well short 
of being a transnational constitution for sport.  No one institution has a mo-
nopoly of jurisdiction over sport internationally.”  Id.  However, there are 
some normative trends in the hierarchy of world sports:  
[N]ational sports bodies resolve disputes within their sports and 
within their borders; international federations review decisions of na-
tional bodies within a particular sport; National Olympic Committees 
operate across different sports and intervene in disputes at a national 
level; the organs of the International Olympic Committee or an inter-
national federation may review a decision of a National Olympic 
Committee; independent arbitration panels may deal with ad hoc 
disputes; and finally the courts of various countries may become in-
volved, and in particular normally recognize and enforce foreign arbi-
tration awards or court judgments to the extent that their national 
law so provides, in accordance with international agreements and 
principles of comity, reciprocity and judicial cooperation.   
BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 8.91–.92. 
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source of that body of law.  This source has been called the lex 
sportiva.184   
CAS opinions have introduced some general legal principles 
into the arena of sports law, such as deference to field-of-play 
decisions; purposive interpretation of rules and regulations; 
protection of athletes’ rights to due process, including the right 
to a fair hearing and notice; and the contractual norms of good 
faith,185 benefit of the doubt186 and legitimate expectations.187 
The CAS has also focused on harmonizing the procedural and 
substantive rules used by national and international sports 
governing bodies.188  This is a lofty goal, and it is unlikely that 
there will ever be complete uniformity.  Nevertheless, as lead-
ers of the sports law movement, the IOC, the CAS and the in-
ternational federations have a duty to eliminate as many vari-
ables as possible.189  Bolstering the IOC’s arbitration scheme 
  
 184. NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 48.  But see Haagen, supra note 161, at 7.  
 185. BELOFF ET AL., supra note 36, §§ 7.116–.127.  Beloff illustrates the legal 
principle of good faith with the case of a water-polo player who tested positive 
for salbutamol, a substance allowed by FINA, the international federation 
governing water sports, as long as it is disclosed prior to a doping test.  The 
player had not disclosed the salbutamol; however, he was able to demonstrate 
that on his national federation’s list of banned and permitted substances, the 
substance was listed as permitted, without any other indication or conditions.  
The CAS annulled the sanction, asserting that an athlete should be able to 
trust information given to him by his national federation.  Id. 
 186. Id. § 7.122.  In a horse-doping case where jars containing urine sam-
ples were not sealed in accordance with the FEI’s regulations, it was impossi-
ble to formally exclude any possibility of manipulation or contamination of the 
jars.  Therefore, the CAS considered this an element of doubt which had to 
benefit the athlete.  Id.  
 187. Id. § 7.124.  Where a sporting organization chooses to temporarily de-
part from its established rules in certain circumstances, athletes unaware of 
the change cannot be bound by such arbitrary moves.  Id.   
 188. See Otton, supra note 69, ¶ 43 (“Its principal aim was and is to secure 
the settlement of sports related disputes with a longer term objective of har-
monising the procedural rules of national and international sports governing 
bodies.”).  See also NAFZIGER, supra note 8, at 51 (“It is true that one of the 
interests of [CAS] is to develop a jurisprudence that can be used as a reference 
by all the actors of world sport, thereby encouraging the harmonization of the 
judicial rules and principles applied within the sports world.”).  
 189. See Nafziger, supra note 19, at 179 (“Ongoing efforts to simplify and 
better coordinate the unwieldy structure for resolving disputes, in particular, 
and to improve the accountability of the pertinent institutions, will benefit 
athletes, sports organizations and the public alike.”). 
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with a more precise and predictable federation-wide appellate 
system is an important step toward that harmonization.190 
 
Kristin L. Savarese∗ 
  
 190. See id. at 162. 
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